

## CONFLICT SIMULATION

### SECOND LEBANON WAR - 2006

#### What do I need for this game?

To play this simulation you will need:

- a. One game board
- b. One 6 side die
- c. Counters bag

#### What is this?

- \* This is a solitaire simulation of the Second Lebanon War 2006. The player represents the Israeli supreme political leadership (i.e. the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet) contested by the designed system, representing Hezbollah.
- \* The player's aim is to defend his home-front from rockets fired at it by Hezbollah, and to maintain and improve his political conditions, domestically and internationally, towards the end of the game.
- \* The player must consider various factors that affects the campaign's outcome: domestic and international political factors, military mobilisation and operational successes and losses.
- \* The player will keep good record of points on two designated tables: domestic political points and international political points. A third table will be used to keep track of turns. Each turn ends only after playing all phases.
- \* The initial setting of the simulation represents the first stage of the conflict. Therefore, the player has thirty-three days of war to simulate in eleven turns.

#### Victory and loss conditions:


- \* A victory will be achieved if by the last turn the player managed to maintain a minimal level of at least 3 international political points, and 1 domestic political point. Any lower final result is considered as a loss. The higher the score, more solid is the player's political condition - a representation of the diplomatic advantage in ceasefire negotiations.
- \* An immediate loss is called if at any point of the game the player's international political score shown on the board is lower than 1. It is therefore possible for the player to keep playing the simulation even if he had temporarily lost all of his domestic political points. But it is impossible to play the simulation without any international political support (for further discussion on political points rational, please see: *Design Notes*).

## The Board

- \* The board provides a visual representation of the campaign and allows you to keep record of your progress throughout the simulation.
- \* The map and the zones: This is a map of Lebanon, divided into six zones. The lower part of the map shows the northern part of Israel, bordering with South Lebanon.
- \* The scales: See three scales on the board: *1. Domestic Political Track, 2. International Political Track, 3. Turns Track*.
- \* Targets' locations: See different types of designated targets on the board. Missile targets' locations are marked like this:      Locations for Infrastructure targets are marked with the letter **I** and with the target's number. For example, Beirut International Airport is marked like this:  
Bridges' locations are marked this way:  
Hezbollah HQs in Beirut are marked this way:      and roads are marked by this sign:  
Locations of Hezbollah squads locations are marked with this sign:

## What is the initial setting?







Before you can start playing the simulation, you must set the system to the starting mode.

- \* The Israeli public opinion supports your actions, and the international community supports your right for self-defence. This provides you with 6 domestic political points, and 6 international political points.
- \* The Defence Forces (IDF) over night successfully destroyed most of Hezbollah long range missiles, and attacked both from the air and from the ground several Hezbollah outposts along the Israeli-Lebanese border line. The attack on the long-range missiles is a major military success with strategic implications. However, this operation was not well reported in the media and the public opinion is not fully aware of your military achievement. Therefore this operation will not affect your political score.
- \* Make sure you have placed the markers correctly on the relevant tables shown on the board.
- \* Place the missile targets on the designated locations on the map, marked with this sign:
- \* Place the infrastructure targets on the designated locations. For example, Infrastructure Target marked I5 should be placed on the I5 location on the map:
- \* Place the Hezbollah squads' targets on the designated locations on the map, marked with this sign:
- \* You have two brigades at your disposal for the first stages of the war.
- \* Once sent into battle, all ground forces are limited to Zones 4 and/or 5, at your decision.
- \* Place your initial ground forces (marked with this sign: ) inside the Israeli territory, close to the border.
- \* It is for you to decide when and how to use ground forces, and at what stage of the simulation. However, on turn 3 you will have to make a decision whether to mobilise reserve forces.
- \* **See: Reserve Ground Forces Activation.**

## The counters

- This table provides you the key to counters and their marking system.
- Please note that targets' code appears in the lower left side of the counters inside a black circle (see the key table below).
- The target's value number appears in the lower right side of the counters inside a black triangular.
- Figures inside the black diamonds represents the domestic political reward and/or penalty in case of a successful attack (see examples below).
- Figures inside the black square represents international political reward and/or penalty in case of a successful attack.
- (See additional information in: ***Phase 3 - Battle/Attack***)

Type/Code	Counter
Israeli Air force (IAF)	
IDF Infantry Division (reserve)	
IDF Armour Division (reserve)	
IDF Brigade (initial forces)	
HS Hezbollah Squads	
M Hezbollah Missiles	

Type/Code	Counter
<b>Infrastructure Target</b> <b>I-1 and I-2</b>  Hezbollah HQ in Beirut	
<b>Infrastructure Target</b> <b>I-3</b>  Beirut International Airport	
<b>Infrastructure Target</b> <b>I-4, I-5, I-16</b>  Roads	
<b>Infrastructure Target</b> <b>I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10</b>  Bridges	
<b>Intelligence Modifier</b>	
<b>Markers</b>	

## What is there in every phase, and how do I play the game?

Before beginning to play the game, you must place the counters on the board. Refer to previous section on *Initial Setting*.

This simulation has eleven turns. Each turn is combined of 4 phases;

1. **Intelligence phase**
2. **Plan and Deployment phase**
3. **Battle Phase** with two sub phase:
  - Air force
  - Ground forces
4. **Damage Assessment phase**

### **Phase One - Intelligence:**

The intelligence phase is played at the beginning of each turn.

- \* Roll a die. The score will represent the number of a 'hot area', i.e.: an area with most recent and intense missile launching activity.
- \* Place the modifier marker on the chosen area. The Intelligence Modifier will provide one extra point, domestic or international, in case of a successful attack, conditionally it is a result of an action taken place in the zone in which the intelligence counter is located during that turn.

### **Phase Two - Plan and Deployment:**

Plan and Deployment is the second phase of each turn. Here you will have to consider your further operational moves, taking into account the information you have obtained in the intelligence phase along with your military capabilities and political considerations.

- \* **PLAN:** Consider which targets to attack.

#### **\* DEPLOY:**

- \* Air Force/Ground Forces: In this game, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacks missiles and infrastructure targets, and ground forces attacks Hezbollah squads. You are allowed to conduct six air sorties in each battle phase, and you are limited to one ground forces attack per turn, during turns 1,2,3. Place the appropriate counters, air force or ground forces, on your chosen targets.
- \* Ground Forces Movement: Ground forces attacks in movement. Should you choose to move and attack any of your ground forces, you may do so during this phase only. You are limited to one ground force ground forces attack per turn until reserve forces are in the theatre.
- \* Additional force will allow you to conduct two ground movements/attacks per turn.
- \* Any ground force may launch only two consecutive attacks against the same target (one attack in each turn), and then it must be moved.

- \* Ground forces can move only directly from zone to zone, and cannot skip zones on the map. You are allowed to withdraw any of your forces at any time back into the Israeli territory.
- \* All ground forces in this simulation are limited to zones 4 and 5 only.
- \* **NOTE: On turn 3 you must decide whether to mobilise reserve units or not, and if so to what extent. Please read through further sections: *Ground Forces Attack* and *Reserves Ground Forces Activation*.**

### **Phase 3 - Battle:**

The Battle Phase is the third phase of each turn. It is the execution of your operational plan decided during the previous phase, and it reveals the affects of your attack on the political tracks.

NOTE:

- \* Missile targets may be suppressed. In such a case, remove the counter from the board until reactivation.
- \* Missile targets that were not suppressed remains active and are firing into your territory.
- \* A missile target can be under suspension for one turn only. It must be reactivated in the next turn, before rolling the die for the intelligence phase. To reactivate, return the counter to its designated location.

ATTACK:

#### **Air Force Attack:**

- \* You must follow the same protocol listed below for each target you choose to attack with airpower.
- \* To attack, role a die for each target you have selected and marked in previous phase.
- \* Compare your score with the indicators on the target, and change the markers on your points scales.
- \* **Air sorties against infrastructure targets:**
- \* You receive domestic and international political points if your score equals or is higher than the target's value number (a figure inside a triangular). If so, the target has been destroyed and you may turn the counter upside down.
- \* The figure inside the upper diamond indicates how many political points you have gained in case of a successful attack.

- \* You May lose international points if your score is lower than the target's value number. The level of your penalty is marked on the counter, inside the upper left square.
- \* If your score is lower than the targets value number, the target remains and may be attacked again in future turns.

Air sorties against missile targets:

- \* You receive domestic and international political points if your score equals or is higher than the target's value number. In such a case the target is now suppressed, and you may remove it from the board until reactivation.
- \* You lose international points if your score is lower than the target's value number. The level of your penalty is marked on the counter, inside the upper left square.
- \* If your score is lower than the target's value number, then target remains active and may be attacked again in future turns.

Ground Forces Attack:

Hizbullah squads launch missiles, operates both in open and dense areas, populated or deserted. Your ground forces may engage in fire with Hezbollah fighters.

- \* To attack, role a die for each target you have selected and marked in the previous phase.
- \* Compare your score with the target's value number.
- \* Receive and reduce political points in accordance with the figures on the counter, indicating the domestic and international political implications.
- \* If your score equals or is higher than the target's value number, then your attack is successful. Like with the rest of the targets, the figures inside the diamond and inside the square will indicate your reward and/or penalty.
- \* In case of a successful attack, turn the counter upside down, as this enemy squad is now destroyed.
- \* If your score is lower than the target's value number, refer to lower right-hand diamond to see how many domestic political points you have lost. In case of unsuccessful attack, the target remains and may be attacked again in future turns.

### **Phase Four - Damage Assessment:**

The Damage Assessment is the fourth and last phase of each turn. This phase will help you to assess the political damage caused by the continuation of missiles launching into your territory by targets that were not suppressed and/or were not attacked during this turn.

- \* Roll a die for each missile target that is not suppressed and /or you did not attack in this turn.
- \* If you scored 1,2,3,4 : you lose 1 domestic political point. The target remains.
- \* If you scored 5: the target remains with no affect on your political points.
- \* If you scored 6: you lose 2 domestic political points, and receive 1 international political point.

### **Reserves Ground Forces Activation:**

- \* In the Plan and Deployment Phase of the third turn you must make a decision with regard to reserves recruitment.
- \* You may decide calling for a massive reserve recruitment, a limited reserve recruitment, or not to mobilise any of your additional forces.
- \* Calling for limited reserves will provide you additional force, and in total you will have at your disposal two infantry divisions and three armour divisions, which all conducts small-medium scale operations.
- \* Calling for massive reserve recruitment will provide you the total of four armour divisions and four infantry divisions at your disposal.
- \* Calling for the reserve will affect your political score in the following way: In case of a massive recruitment you will lose two domestic political points and one international political point. If you decide to call for a limited recruitment you lose one international political point and receive one domestic political point. A decision to not call for reserves at all will not affect your international political score, but you will lose one domestic political point. *Consult with the chart for your convenience.*
- \* If you decide to call the reserves, roll a die. The score affects the activation timing: if you have scored 1-3, you may use the reserves only after another two turns. If you have scored 4-6, you may use the reserves only after three turns. Once in place, reserves can attack at your command in accordance with the the rules on Plane and Deployment as well as on Battle, as listed above.
- \* If you decided to mobilise reserves, place the counters in the Israeli territory until they are allowed inside the battle theatre.



## **Design Notes**

### **Political and Military Decision Making in an Asymmetric Conflict**

This simulation is designed to examine aspects of the politico-military decision making in the Second Lebanon War, summer of 2006. In this strategic solitaire simulation the player represents the Israeli supreme political leadership: the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. It is in the player's power to order any military activity, in accordance with the rules of the game. The player simulates some of the decisions taken by the Israeli political leadership at the highest levels during the war, and he functions at the same time as the chief military commander on the operational theater.

The conflict, and therefore so does the simulations, is multilayered: it is combined of military operational maneuvers and fire, and of political considerations. The battle is not only an armed conflict, but to a large extent a diplomatic and political campaign, with operational success and failures immediately affecting both the domestic and international political arenas. The campaign is therefore played in two main theaters: the operational as well as the political.

While military capabilities were taken into account in designing the simulation, the emphasis remains on the political dimension of the war and particularly on the decision making aspects, rather than on small military tactics or battle mechanics. The battle friction, operational success and failures, problems with military supply and so forth were all taken into account in the design, while considering questions of probability, calculating political scores and designing the game's system. For example, restrictions on number of ground forces attacks are in place, to illustrate the extreme difficulties that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had as a result of low level of preparedness. The player comes to realize that wide deployment is not a guarantee for success.

The main goal of the player is to stop the rockets from being fired into the Israeli territory and to maintain political support, internationally and domestically. While the incentives for the player may be clear, he still faces major challenges with conflicting factors. The player must make critical decisions throughout the campaign, and particularly he must determine whether to relay on standoff firepower, or to prefer ground operation. He also must to decide whether to mobilize reserve units or not, and if so - to what extent. Alternatively, he may choose not recruit any additional force, and to use the forces already present on the ground before the conflict's outbreak. In making this decision the player must take into account the length of reserves' recruitment and deployment (exemplified in rules' section on ground forces activation) as well as the political implications of

various alternatives, as any decision he makes may result a political reward or penalty that will be shown on the political scales.

Another key decision the player must take is to choose what are the targets his armed forces attacks. Successful attacks on Lebanese civilian infrastructure targets are likely to increase the domestic political support, as they may provide an impression of firm action against the enemy, and may also appease the domestic public opinion. But they also risks the player with losing international political support in case of civilian casualties. On the other hand, some attacks on infrastructure targets may be proven as useful, should they increase the political pressure on the Lebanese government, potentially improving Israel's international political status. Yet the player may soon realize how irrelevant attacking infrastructure targets is to the goal of preventing missiles from being launched to his territory. This will also be the case with attacking Hezbollah HQ in Beirut: the attack may be politically rewarding, but even after destruction Hezbollah forces on the ground maintain their ability to launch missile attacks, as well as to engage in fire with IDF ground forces. This exhibits some of the aspects of an asymmetric conflict such as this, where the survival in battle of the non-state actor/armed organisation is not necessarily depended on traditional command and control mechanisms, as the standing army relies on.

### **The Rational and The Meaning of Political Points System**

The player's aim is to gain political points on both tracks, internationally and domestically. Every action may result receiving or losing political points.

The assumption is that the basic support and identification of the Israeli public opinion with the country is fixed, and it is extremely unlikely to see a shift towards embracing Hezbollah's positions, or to see any acceptance of the enemy's views as the main stream politics. Therefore, a loss of domestic political point does not suggests that the Israeli public opinion leans towards the enemy. It does mean that the general public is dissatisfied with the governments performance. It reflects the public dismay, confusion and frustration of the continues severe damage in the home-front, civilian casualties and soldiers' fatalities in battle. The lower the political score is, the higher is the domestic political pressure. In contrast, a high level of domestic political points suggests the public is willing to provide the government the leverage for further diplomatic or small/medium scale military activity.

The international political track is a representation of the Israeli condition in terms of international diplomacy. More accurately, it is an numerical and visual illustration of its ability to end the conflict in the most convenient and preferable way, according to its national security interests. A loss of international political points does not suggests that international community moved to support

Hezbollah, nor does it reflect a strong support of the Lebanese government. It does mean that the international community, or international public opinion, is dissatisfied with Lebanese civilian casualties and with the suffering of civilian population. It reflects the international will to end the conflict as soon as possible. However, when high level of mortalities is seen in the Israeli side, some of the international pressure may be eased, exemplified in a “reward” of an international political point in sympathy with the victims. The lower the international political points are, the higher is the international pressure on the player, and less convenient are the end game conditions.

The player soon learns that the political score, on both tracks, is not an unlimited credit. He must navigate in conflicting constraints. For example, how to respond to the domestic demand for a swift solution of the rockets problem, while avoiding the severe political damage of high level of casualties in battle; The effective use of airpower, while avoiding the loss of international support as a result of so called “collateral damage”.

### **The Questions of Victory Conditions**

In accordance with the historical analysis, this simulation illustrates the complex question of victory conditions in the Second Lebanon War. It lies on a deeper discussion on another question: what constitutes a victory in an asymmetric conflict? And in the case of the Second Lebanon War, would the suppression of all missile activity be considered as a victory? Or, would it be the destruction of all of the enemy squads? Is it even achievable?

Alternatively, a different terminology may be used: “success”, instead of “victory”. An Operational success may reward the player politically, or to the very least may prevent catastrophic loss of political support domestically. At the same time, it should be complemented by sufficient international support that allows a diplomatic exit arrangement (the diplomatic mechanism that resolves the conflict, or at least ends the present round of hostilities) to be the most convenient and preferable in the player's view.

Such considerations would raise again the need to review the political implications of operational successes and failures, targets selection, reserves mobilization, airpower usage versus ground activity, etc. The interrelation between these factors during the simulation, and between additional factors in reality, may bring us closer to the conclusion that the victory conditions are more of an elusive nature. And for the purpose of this game, they may be defined as a combination of international political points and domestic political points.

In the summer of 2006 the fire ceased only as result of a diplomatic arrangement voted on in the United Nations' Security Council. The Israeli leadership negotiated with various international actors on the designated arrangement that eventually included the deployment of international forces in South Lebanon, correspondingly with Israeli demands. In spite of serious erosion in its international political support that it had suffered in later stages of the war, and despite the increasing domestic

political pressure, Israel's actions may be regarded as a success and not as a failure, considering the decided and implemented agreement. In contrast, the internal political fallout of the 2006 events 2006 was severe: it resulted the resignation of the IDF Chief of Staff, the first airmen to serve as the IDF most senior commander, as well as the resignation of the Israeli Minister of Defence. The third side of the Israeli senior War leadership triangle, the Prime Minister, managed to survive politically despite constant public pressure and demand for his resignation. He was later ousted from office because of corruption allegations.

This is the very essence of the results of the war they unfolded historically, and therefore the victory conditions' expression in this simulation relates to the end game conditions, in which a minimal degree of domestic political support may be needed, but a critical degree of international support is essential to secure a reliable, feasible and timely diplomatic solution that will allow a the fire to be ceased in the most convenient conditions. Respectively, a loss of too many international political points underneath a certain minimal level results a loss of the entire campaign, regardless of how high the domestic political support is. Further more, high international support may project on the domestic public opinion, but it is irrelevant if the threat remains and rockets are still being fired.

### **The Board: Map and Targets**

The board provides a visual representation of the operational progress and its political implications on both tracks, internationally and domestically. The map presents parts of the two countries that are relevant to this simulation: almost all of Lebanon, and parts of Northern Israel. The remaining section of Lebanon had marginal part in the war, if at all, and despite the wide range of missiles impact inside Israel much further beyond the part shown on the board - these parts are irrelevant to this specific design. The targets that were available in Lebanon, and indeed the amount of air sorties conducted, were numerous. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted more air sorties in one front during this war, than it did over two remote fronts during the Yom-Kippur War in 1973. The challenge was therefore to illustrate the vast use of airpower and available targets, while maintaining high level of playability. In other words, to make the game works, securing the decision making element, and at the same time not to waive essential historical features.

The division into six zones mainly serves the design needs, especially when providing variable incentives to the player in the form of extra points for "hot areas". Such mechanism balances between battle uncertainty, intelligence advantage and the likelihood to gain political reward. However, the division is not all random: apart of the obvious zone division that demonstrates the significance of Beirut as the Lebanese capitol and home for Hezbollah HQs, other zones in Southern Lebanon matches the Israeli army's view of the area, dividing the South into a Western Section and Eastern Section. Their marking on board corresponds with historical facts.

## **The Counters**

The counters' graphics and the mathematical mechanics both maintain similar principles: simplicity, clarity and historical accuracy. All symbols and images shown on the counters were carefully selected and they are all authentic. For example, the image on the Hezbollah Squad's counter is indeed of a Hezbollah fighter; the images on the Israeli forces, infantry, armour and air force, are authentic as well; the icon shown on of the Brigades counter is of IDF's Galilee Division that took part in the campaign, and the sign on the Intelligence Modifier counter is the shield of IDF Military Intelligence Division (Aman), which played a critical part in this war.

The clarity principle dictated a balance between some degree of sophistication, and yet ensuring that the critical elements remains comprehensible. The need was to make sure the graphics presents the essential information such as the targets' code, value number, political penalty and reward in the clearest way, while adding some "flavor" with historical accuracy. This may help to follow the first principal of simplicity: the simulation must remain easy to play. The rational is to leave the player free to make political and military considerations, rather than spending too much time on struggling to decode the counters and the rules.

## Second Lebanon War Historical Analysis

This historical analysis is limited to the general geopolitical elements that are critical to understanding the setting of the war. The main characteristic of the two actors, Israel and Hezbollah, are discussed while emphasising the nature and typology of the conflict. It is followed by review of the military resources of both sides that are relevant to the battle theater, and a description of the battle as it unfolded.

### Background

It is impossible to disconnect the 2006 events from the context of previous situation on the ground as it developed after Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, as well as a long history of tensed events since the first Lebanon War of 1982.

The Lebanese government, as did Hezbollah, denied the Israeli-UN declaration<sup>1</sup> recognising a complete withdrawal correspondingly with the UN Security Council Resolution 425.<sup>2</sup> Hezbollah, along with the Lebanese government, argued that Israel did not fulfil all of its obligations since it did not withdrawal from the 'Shabba Farms', taken from Syrian during the 1967 War. On the other hand, Israel and the UN regarded this disputed area as a Syrian territory that would be negotiated with Syria (likely as part of a peace pact negotiations). Lebanon claimed ownership over the disputed territory, whereas Hezbollah used it as a cause to justify its attacks against Israel.<sup>3</sup> Those attacks took place in spite of the Israeli expectation to benefit from its unilateral withdrawal, as it hoped to see erosion in Hezbollah's internal and international legitimacy.<sup>4</sup>

There has been several political shifts that contributed to the tensed atmosphere during that time: Syria witnessed a change-of-guard following the death of President Hafez El-Asad, and the rise of his son, the young Ophthalmologist Bashar El-Asad (July 2000); Lebanon was in a political unrest, with increasing voices demanding Syrian withdrawal from its territory.<sup>5</sup> Two months before the Syrian pulled-out, Lebanon experienced another internal storm with the spread of the news on the

---

1 United Nations (2000), Press Release SC/6878 '*SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSES SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONCLUSION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AS OF 16 JUNE*'

2 UN Security Council resolution 425 was voted on March 19, 1978. Article two called Israel to 'cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdrawal forthwith its forces from Lebanese territory'.

3 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report (April 2007), p. 39

4 *ibid.*, articles 2 and 4.

5 *ibid.*, p. 40

mysterious assassination on Prime Minister Rafik El-Hariri (February, 2005). The arrows were pointed at Damascus.<sup>6</sup>

The broader Middle-East was already in a turmoil following the war in Iraq. This was also the setting for an increasing involvement of Iran and of its pursue for regional hegemony, as well as the context for its continuing efforts both in heavily arming Hezbollah, and in its race for nuclear capabilities.<sup>7</sup>

## **Build Up and Containment**

The tension between Israel and Hezbollah was gradually mounting between 2000-2006. These years were characterised by two parallel factors: a massive build up on both sides of the border; and with an Israeli policy of 'containment'.

There are several examples to illustrate Hezbollah and Israeli policies, among them the October 2000 events, in which Hezbollah abducted three Israel Defence Force (IDF) soldiers, while patrolling the Eastern sector of the Israeli-Lebanese border. It was followed by a sophisticated operation few days later, to abduct an Israeli citizen. Another example is the March 2002 attack, in which a Hezbollah squad penetrated Israel and murdered six Israelis.<sup>8</sup> In both of these incidents, as well as in others, the Israeli response was limited to targeting what was then called 'impetuses of influence and pressure on Hezbollah'.<sup>9</sup> Despite specific and determined promises to retaliate, Israel limited itself to the Containment Policy. The Winograd Commission later named it as the 'Containment Era'.<sup>10</sup>

## **The Israeli 'Containment Policy'**

Israel, from its side, made significant preparations before the 2000 withdrawal, and invested more than one billion Shekels (equal to 201.4 million GBP) in building a new fortified border line, coupled with large investment in new intelligence-sensors systems.<sup>11</sup> In the years to come, the Israeli defence establishment, and indeed Israeli policy-makers, were occupied by events in the Palestinian theatre and counter-terrorism operations. With tensions rising on that front - the Israelis

---

6 'A New Report on Hariri's Murder' *Time*, March 29, 2008. Beirut, Lebanon. By Nicholas Blanford

7 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report p. 40

8 for detailed order of events, see Intermediate Report, p.151-152

9 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 39

10 Ibid., p. 44-45

11 ibid., p. 39

were reluctant to open the Northern front.<sup>12</sup>

The main principal of the Israeli Containment Policy towards Hezbollah was simple: it intended to prevent further escalation, and containing any violence to limited scales. This represents the Israeli approach towards Hezbollah and Lebanon before 2006.

### **Hezbollah's Preparations**

However on the other end, Hezbollah, was preparing itself extensively and effectively. Its preparations were focused both on the operational as well as the logistical levels, and modifications in structure of command. In addition to building up its arsenal, Hezbollah was engaged in great engineering works in Southern Lebanon:

'Infrastructure included underground command and control centres, observation posts, and surveillance sites; fighter hide-sites and preserved rocket launch positions; border defences; minefields and other obstacles, as well as arms caches and supply and support bases dispersed down to the house level.'<sup>13</sup>

The fierce fighting on the ground unveiled high level of readiness and the extensive preparation made by Hezbollah between 2000-2006.

### **An Asymmetric Conflict**

While establishing the general geopolitical background to the war by illustrating the progression of events as they have unfolded before July 12, 2006, in this part We shall focus on the key features of the two actors that are relevant to understanding the unique nature of this conflict and defining it as an Asymmetric Conflict.

Hezbollah is a complex organisation with multiple functions: it is a terror organisation with strong political branches that takes an active part in the internal political life in Lebanon. At the same time it functions as an armed militia controlling de-facto a large area of Lebanon. It is also a proxy of Iran, both in ideology and in operational terms. On the operational level, it conducts guerilla operations as well as terror attacks in the region and beyond. It is therefore a heavily armed non-state actor, with large-scale ground control equipped with semi-military capabilities, that conducts both guerrilla and terror operations. Professor Yitzhak Ben-Israel defined it as a:

---

12      *ibid.*, p. 45; The report quotes the testimony of General Gabi Ashkenazi, Commander of the Northern Command and Deputy Chief of Staff - who later appointed Chief of staff after the resignation of General Dan Halutz: "...we were silencing it here, in order not to open an additional front"

13      Arkin, p. 26



'Military-style structured organisation, with logic of a terror organisation, and modus operandi of a guerrilla organisation'.<sup>14</sup>

Biddle and Friedman (2008) also recognise the special features of the Hezbollah units with

'A formal chain of command operated from designated and well-equipped command posts; used real time communications systems... ..encrypted radio, issued orders, changed plans and moved some elite units over considerable distances...'<sup>15</sup>

On the other end, Israel is a state actor, behaving in more of a "classical" manner as a democracy with an elected accountable institutions, clear (and yet not always effective) chain of command and so forth. Its armed forces are known to be with strong capabilities, and designated to fight large conventional armies in the middle-east. The asymmetry stands out clearly merely by reviewing the basic features of the two actors.

Another asymmetry arises by looking into the potential gains and losses that lies in the basic rational of each one of the adversaries. Hezbollah could always claim victory over Israel if only could it survive an Israeli attack. However, for Israel survival is not a sufficient condition. A 'victory' for Israel could only be a massive damage to Hezbollah and paralysing its ability to launch rockets and missiles into Israeli territory.<sup>16</sup>

---

14 Ben-Israel, Yitzhak (2007) p. 10

15 Biddle, Stephen and Friedman, A. Jeffrey (2008) p. 59

16 Ben-Israel, p. 11

## Forces, Means and Deployment

This part of the study will provide description of forces' arrangement on the ground, and of the means the actors possessed that are relevant to the conflict.

### Israel:

IDF found to be ill prepared to the 2006 conflict. In the late 1990s and until 2006, most of IDF's efforts were dedicated to counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank and in the Gaza strip. This time was characterised by serious decrease in military exercises both for the standing army as well as for reserves. Cuts in the defence budget and neglecting of the reserve army. Soldiers lost some of their essential skills, and the military gear for the reservists in the emergency storage units found to be in a very poor condition.<sup>17</sup> And in the years following the pullout from what used to be the 'security zone', the IDF seem to have lost the close familiarity it once had with Lebanon's terrain, as well as its experience in engaging with Hezbollah fighters.

On the morning of July 12, 2006, just before the turning point towards the war, the IDF deployment along the border was on a normal routine mode. The forces on the border were assembled from: Division 91 that was in charge of the securing the border zone from the Mediterranean Sea in the west, to the Mount (Har) Dov area in the East, and it was also in charge on reservists' battalion that was positioned in the Western section of the border. East to Division 91 was the junction with Division 36 that was deployed in the Golan Heights. Division 91 had a significant role during the war, and within its jurisdiction the conflict begun with the abduction of two of reserve soldiers.

In the midst of the war IDF changed its forces deployment, and used various forces in addition to its regular standing divisions in the area. IDF operated with about than 10,000 soldiers on the ground, along with tens of thousands reservists supporting all other military corps in total, it had used two infantry divisions and three armoured divisions.<sup>18</sup> 155mm artillery shells were used,<sup>19</sup> along with use of cluster bombs in MLRS pods.<sup>20</sup> The IDF Navy was mainly enforcing the blockade on Lebanon coasts, while the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had the lion's share in the battle. During 34 days of fighting, IAF vehicles (manned and unmanned) conducted 17,550 aerial sorties, about 520 a day. 350 vehicles launched various munitions, including 'smart' guided bombs, and 'iron' unguided bombs, as well as 'Hellfire' rockets from helicopters.<sup>21</sup>

---

17 Shelah and Limor, pp. 317-324

18 'Halutz, Olmert and Adam are about to sweat', *Haaretz*, February 2, 2007. Tel-Aviv, Israel, by Amos Harel; Also see Harel and Issacharof, map and chart of 'Operation Change Direction 11'

19 *ibid*

20 'Two UN soldiers injured in cluster bombs explosion in south Lebanon, *Haaretz*, January 30, 2007, by Miron Rapoport.

21 Shelah and Limor, pp. 241-242

### Hezbollah:

Since it was founded in 1982, Hezbollah has mounted an impressive arsenal of rockets in varied ranges.<sup>22</sup> They were stored in special sites in Southern Lebanon for future use.

This chart, appeared in Ben-Israel's study<sup>23</sup>, describes the different types of rockets used by Hezbollah during the war. Other rockets were destroyed before use, and others left unused.

<i>Type</i>	<i>Maximum Range (km)</i>	<i>Warhead (kg)</i>	<i>Estimated initial amount</i>	<i>(Amount Launched)</i>	<i>Original manufacturer</i>
Katyusha 12 mm	20	18-7	12000	3500	USSR
Katyusha 122 mm extended	42	18	1000	500	China
Fajar 3	43	85	1,000 (total sum of all medium rockets of Fajar type and beyond)	200 (total sum of all medium rockets of Fajar type and beyond)	Iran
Fajar 5	70	175			Iran
Rocket 220 mm	70-50	100-85			Syria
Rocket 302 mm	115-170				Syria
Zilzal 1	125	600			Iran
Zilzal 2	210	600			Iran
Zilzal 3	250	600			Iran
Total:			14000	4200	

In addition too other 'personal' types of arms, Hezbollah extensively used different kinds of anti-tank missiles, including modern laser-guidance (Anti-tank missiles like: Metis-M, AT-13 or 9M131; Kornet-E, AT-14 or 9P133; Konkurs; Sagger, AT-3; Fagot, AT-4 or 9K111; Spandrel, At-5; Raad; Milan - wire guided missile; Dragon and more).<sup>24</sup> Hezbollah also used mortar-shells, antiaircraft

<sup>22</sup> Ben-Israel, p. 7

<sup>23</sup> ibid., p. 8

<sup>24</sup> Arkin (2007) p. 36

guns, RPG launchers including modern types. It used C-802 anti-ship missile (targeting Israeli naval vessel), as well as UAVs for reconnaissance and combat mode (although not successfully)<sup>25</sup>; Hezbollah had no lack of explosive, given the extent of preparing booby traps explosive devices on roads in Southern Lebanon.<sup>26</sup>

Hezbollah used private apartments in populated areas and new underground bunkers in the open areas as rockets storage centres, as well as launching sites.<sup>27</sup> (See photos illustrating the complexity of locating these targets as well as the difficulty fighting around it)




---

25 Ben-Israel, p. 7 see footnote 4; And Arkin p. 28-29

26 Arkin p.30

27 Intelligence & Counter Terrorism Information Center, *Second Lebanon War - A Year After* (Hebrew) p. 5-6.  
Photos: IDF



Hezbollah's high command was based in the Lebanese capital of Beirut mainly in the Dahiya area in the Southern part of the city. In addition, it had provisional units and commands operating in different locations in Southern Lebanon, ranging from the Southern to the Northern sides of the Litany River and the Bekka valley.<sup>28</sup> Hezbollah also enjoyed massive support of Shiite population across the country, which in no doubt strengthened its operational core of 1,000 'regular fighters', with additional 3,000 'reservists'.<sup>29</sup>

## The War

During July 12, the first day of the conflict, Division 91 (also known as "Galilee Division", commanded by Brigadier General Gal Hirsch) was focused on four main moves: immediate response to the abduction including an attempt to block the escape routes; destruction of Hezbollah posts along the border contact line by using stand-off fire-power; sealing the border line to prevent further penetration of Hezbollah squads; and an attempt to rescue four bodies of Israeli soldiers who's tank was hit earlier that day in the pursuit after the Hezbollah's squad.<sup>30</sup>

Following the immediate IDF local response Israel launched a series of air-strikes on 69 targets

---

28      *ibid.* p. 23-24

29      *ibid.*, p. 25

30      Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 84

around South Lebanon such as roads, bridges and Hezbollah infrastructure.<sup>31</sup> Israeli Navy ships fired on five Hezbollah targets, and prepared for enforcing a blockade. That day, Hezbollah fired at least 22 rockets into Israel that day, and caused injuries to two Israeli civilians.<sup>32</sup>

The Israeli cabinet assembled that evening, concluding its emergency meeting with a decision to take firm actions against Hezbollah.<sup>33</sup> However, there is no evidence not in books written neither after the war nor in the Winograd Commission that investigated the conflict, that the Israeli cabinet had a clear conscious decision made by Israel to open a war. In other words, the Israeli leadership was entering a war without understanding its own deeds, and without defining objectives clearly enough.

Over night, between July 12 and July 13, IDF conducted a large scale air raid, while bombing the Fajar Rockets storage positions of Hezbollah in operation named "Mishkal Sgulli".<sup>34</sup> Tens of targets were attacked in 34 minutes destroying significant portion of Hezbuallah's mid and long range Fajar rockets as well as 44 launchers.<sup>35</sup> By doing so, Israel reduced Hezbollah's ability to launch rockets on the Israeli home-front especially the long-range ones. And yet, it did not prevent other rockets from been fired. The next day, Hezbollah fired 125 rockets into Israel, causing two civilian casualties, and 69 wounded (of which two were soldiers).<sup>36</sup> Those attacks turned to be a repeated patter throughout the whole war: while IDF continued operating in various methods from the air and on the ground, Hezbollah continued firing its rockets into Israel. In their book, Shelah and Limor provide a description of an incident that took place during the last week of the war:

'... Former commander of IDF Northern Command entered the Northern Command Air-Force Control Room. "I bet", he said to the officers, and "that 80 per cent of the Katyusha rockets fired into the Galilee are being launched from no more than four of five areas. Why won't you go for these areas, put everything you've got and invest all your efforts there, and reduce the numbers of Katyushas?"

The officers were amazed, for it was the first time the matter was presented to them in such a way. A quick check reviled that the former General was right'.<sup>37</sup>

---

31 Shelah and Limor, p. 25

32 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 84

33 ibid. p. 82

34 ibid. p. 85

35 Shelah and Limor. p. 77

36 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 90

37 Shelah and Limor, p. 241

This description depicts the mind-sets of the Israeli military leadership, as well as Hezbollah's incentive to continue fire rockets. While IDF was focused in early stages on operating against Hezbollah posts along Israeli-Lebanese border and against Hezbollah's quarter in Beirut (known as the Dahyia) the organisation kept on firing. Tens and dozens of rockets were launched into Israel, while the IAF continued its air strikes against roads and bridges and some Hezbollah posts including some of its long range missiles (Zilzal).<sup>38</sup>

In an emergency recruitment some reserve battalions were called in, but only in the sixth day of the conflict and still on a very limited scale; IAF attacks continued also in the Bekka Valley in Southern Lebanon<sup>39</sup>, and half a million civilians left their homes fleeing from the Israeli attacks as Hezbollah continued firing more and more rockets.<sup>40</sup>

Significant reported Clashes between Israeli infantries and Hezbollah fighters as part of the ground operation took place for the first time on Wednesday, July 19 2006. Until then, IDF's *modus operandi* was characterised by limited ground activity close to the border line<sup>41</sup> and with heavy stand-off air-power.<sup>42</sup> The Shiite Muslim village, Marun A-Ras was the battle zone in which five IDF soldiers died as well as few dozens of Hezbollah fighters.<sup>43</sup>

The battle of Marun A-Ras unveils the main features of most of the engagements between IDF soldiers and Hezbollah fighters in this conflict. Hezbollah men were operating inside and in between the village houses. According to IDF accounts, Hezbollah fighters were hiding on geographically higher positions that enabled them better control of the area. Hezbollah was also able to divide their squads to specific groups: group of fighters trained in launching anti-tank missiles, groups of fighters specialised in mines and explosives and groups specialised in 'infantry warfare'.<sup>44</sup> There were also reports on operations of Hezbollah's tactic Sigint-intelligence units.

Similar elements were seen few days later in a different battle in the village of Bint-Jbail (July 23). Golani and Tzanhanim (the Paratroopers brigade) infantry brigades were instructed to surround the

---

38 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 155 (see table, day 7)

39 *ibid.* p. 95

40 *ibid.* p 155-156

41 Harel and Issacharof, p. 235 (the authors names the special IDF units Shaldag, Egoz, and the Special Counter Terror Unit, affiliated to the Israeli Police).

42 Winograd Commission, Final Report, p. 88 (see article 40 'Military Activity')

43 Winograd Commission, Final Report, p. 89

44 Harel and Issacharof, p. 243-247

village and were given orders to 'raid it, opposed to occupying it'.<sup>45</sup> Hezbollah was already expecting the IDF incursion and reinforced its fighting squads with dozens of additional fighters - 40 of them from its 'special force' that was better trained.<sup>46</sup> The village was mostly empty of its 20,000 inhabitants which escaped in early days of fighting<sup>47</sup> and Hezbollah fighters were using the empty houses as a cover. The Israeli soldiers' movements were slower than the supreme command expected and Hezbollah was avoiding direct engagement with IDF soldiers. Instead, they used anti-tank missiles and succeed in causing casualties among the Israeli forces.<sup>48</sup>

In the following days of the war IDF continued its ground operation in Bint-Jabil parallel to its continues air-strikes in Beirut and other areas in Lebanon. At the same time, Hezbollah continued its barrage on Israel by launching about 100 rockets a day<sup>49</sup> with a pick of 169 rockets during the fifteen day of the war.<sup>50</sup>

While diplomatic efforts to end the conflict were not successful, the two adversaries continued to operate in the same mode. On July 29 IDF completed an emergency recruitment of reserve divisions though eventually they did not take part of the battle. Following an aerial strike in Kfar-Kana 28 Lebanese civilians were killed and 13 more were missing when a building collapsed as a result of an IAF bombardment.<sup>51</sup> This incident led to a recess in Israeli air strikes for 48 hours, followed by wider ground activity as well as the highest pick of rockets fired into Israel - 230 throughout August 2. At the same time, IDF ground forces operated around villages under the framework of "Direction Change" operational plans in its different variations.<sup>52</sup> The main rationale of IDF of ground operations at the time was 'to hit areas from which rockets are launched'.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to the continuous fighting (in similar patterns), a special commando operation took place over the night of August 1st (day twenty-one of the war). About 200 IDF's elite units soldiers from

---

45      *ibid.* p. 252; The Commander of IDF Northern Command, General Udi Adam repeated his orders again on July 27, stating the aim of the operation is to put pressure on Hezbollah fighters and not to occupy the village (See Winograd Commission Final Report, p. 124, Article 253)

46      Harel and Issacharof, p. 243-247

47      Shelah and Limor, p. 181

48      Harel and Issachroff, p. 252-253

49      Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report, p. 157

50      *ibid.* p. 158

51      *ibid.*

52      Winograd Commission, Final Report. p. 174

53      *ibid.* p. 154 (see description of Military Activity, Division 91 and Division 162. Friday, August 4, 2006)



Shaldag and the Sayeret Matkal units were transported by helicopters and raided two targets in Baal-Bek in the Bekka Valley.<sup>54</sup> The operation was indeed successful and well performed, yet it did not have any significant meaning.<sup>55</sup>

With the failure to reach an agreement on a new United Nations Security Council resolution and despite of great reservations and hesitancy, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence authorised to launch the widest ground operation ('Direction Change 11').<sup>56</sup> The Israeli leadership was trying to improve its positions when the 'game's end' was about to be called. The Israeli cabinet found Litany River as a point to aspire for.<sup>57</sup> When the beginning of the operation IDF deployed the following forces: Division 91 of Golani was moving towards the town of Tibnin; Division 'Pillar of Fire' continued its battles around Marj-A-yun; Division 'Fire' begun its air-born operation and movement towards Jabel Beit-Adura; Division 162 infantries and engineer forces operated along the Saluki river area.<sup>58</sup>

The fighting between IDF soldiers and Hezbollah fighters was fierce. Dozens of Hezbollah were killed as well as tens of Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah continued firing rockets into Israel up to the last day of fighting.<sup>59</sup> IAF attacked targets along the Syrian-Lebanese border and the next day launched its last strike Hezbollah's centre in Beirut - the Dahya. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 the cease-fire was effective as of 08:00, August 14, 2006.

In summary, the conflict claimed the lives of 163 Israelis of which 119 are IDF soldiers; about 400 Lebanese civilians;<sup>60</sup> Hundreds of Israelis and Lebanese wounded and hundreds of Hezbollah fighters.<sup>61</sup>

### **Bibliography**

- 
- 54 Harel and Issacharof, p. 331-334
- 55 ibid. In addition to questions raised regarding the high risk of this operation, the 'assets' the commando soldiers brought with them back were not found to be valuable.
- 56 ibid. p. 190-205
- 57 Harel and Issacharof, p. 398
- 58 Winograd Commission, Final Report, p. 205
- 59 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report. p. 162-163. During August 13, 2006 217 rockets were fired into Israel.
- 60 Human Rights Watch Report, 'Fatal Strikes', p. 3
- 61 Winograd Commission, Intermediate Report. p. 11

- \* Arkin, William M. (2007), *Divining Victory - Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War*. Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. <http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil>
- \* Ben-Israel, Yitzhak (2007), *First Missiles War, Israel-Hezbollah (Summer 2006)*, Tel-Aviv University (printed: May 2007)
- \* Biddle, Stephen and Friedman, A. Jeffrey (September, 2008), *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and The Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Available at: [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/)) (Accessed: 22.11.2008)
- \* Harel, Amos and Issachroff Avi (Tel-Aviv, 2008). *Spider Webs (34 Days)*. Miskal, Yedioth Achronot Books and Chemed Books, Israel
- \* Human Rights Watch Report, '*Fatal Strikes*' (New-York, 2006), Volume 18, No. 3 (E)
- \* Intelligence & Counter Terrorism Information Center, (2007) *Second Lebanon War - A Year After* ICC, August 12, 2007 (Hebrew)
- \* Shelah, Ofer and Limor, Yoav (Tel-Aviv, 2007). *Captives of Lebanon*. Miskal, Yedioth Achronot Books and Chemed Books, Israel
- \* United Nations' Security Council, March 19, 1978. Resolution 425 <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7157333.html>
- \* United Nations June 18, 2000. Press Release SC/6878 '*Security Council Endorses Secretary-General's Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon as of 16 June*' <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html>
- \* United Nations' Security Council, September 2, 2004. Resolution 1559 <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8596786.html>
- \* 'A New Report on Hariri's Murder' *Time*, March 29, 2008. Beirut, Lebanon. By Nicholas Blanford <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1726442,00.html>
- \* Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 ("Winograd Commission"), April 30, 2007 - Intermediate Report. Jerusalem, Israel (Hebrew)
- \* *Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006* ("Winograd Commission") January 30, 2008 - Final Report. Jerusalem, Israel (Hebrew)